[Call To Action]Mirror Steering Committee, Mirror V3 Roadmap

Hello, i am the frontman. I represent a collective of shadowy super coders who want to build Mirror v3 in to the most innovative and attractive synthetics derivative platform available in defi.

In order to do this i need your help . Currently the steering committee consists of the core contributors @Papi and @Sebnondzee and a few others who will remain unnamed for the time being. These contributors have vested interest in the ecosystem and see a huge potential for UST growth via mirror protocol. These contributors have contributed to the road map that i am presenting below .

I want at least 2-4 more contributors , i want contributors who are experts in rust smart contract development , tokenomics , or any relevant background that will help progress our roadmap.

Once we have a few additional contributors we will post a mirror governance proposal that will establish the committee and fund the steering committee multisig wallet. The steering committee will ask for a grant of 250,000 MIR that will be held in a multi sig wallet .These funds will cover the development and audit costs of Mirror v3.

Once the steering committee has agreed upon a road map and consulted with the community we will post a governance proposal , if approved we will post a significant grant for upwards of 300,000 $ UST (maybe more?) that will cover the development of Mirror v3 . We will thoroughly interview teams . Teams will not be paid upfront and once we’ve established a team for the grant they will need to deliver milestones before getting paid, the first milestone being a functional product on the test net.

The core contributors will hold voting rights of the multisig wallet where a 80%+majority rules. The core contributors will have 0 expectation of compensation on the project in the immediate term . However, after we successfully deliver Mirror v3 and bring the next 5 bln tvl to the protocol we will ask for a sizable grant that will reward core contributors and fund their future salaries back pay and bonuses.

Below is our initial road map proposal , this is currently a draft and we will build on this with the help of core contributors.

If you are interested in becoming a core contributor please post your application below. Open to your feedback. This is a new account and i am an anon however core community members and existing contributors can and will vouch for me .

Road Map - Better tokenomics , Better Capital Efficiency , More Use Case

Summary: The Mirror v3 road map aims to address issues around capital efficiency, Mirror (MIR) token value capture , mAsset price stability, and overall capital efficiency of Mirror protocol

Mirror Governance

In order to increase the attractiveness of Mir token we will introduce a new staking derivative xMIR. Mir can be locked in exchange for xMIR, xMIR will accrue value from Mirror buybacks and other value accrual fees.

xMIR will be able to be used as a collateral to mint mAssets.

xMIR and MIR can be used to vote.

When locking Mir for xMIR the longer you lock your Mir token the more xMir you will receive

1000 Mir Locked
30 days 20 xMir
7 days 4.5 xMir
1 Year 250 xMir
2 Years 500 xMir
3 Years 750 xMir
4 Years 1000 xMir

In Mirror V3 a 20% portion of the CDP fee buybacks will be allocated to an aUST reserve. This reserve will constantly grow in value from Anchor yield as well as a constant stream of CDP fees that will be accrued to this reserve.

Each week 1% of the aUST yield reserve will go towards Mir token buybacks. This parameter will be controlled by governance

Discussion Topic:
Other value accrual ideas
Mir can be used for CDP fees with a 5-10% discount on the fees.
Enable governance to allocate the yield reserve to protocol owned liquidity pools.

Capital Efficiency

In order to improve capital efficiency and reduce mAsset spreads Mirror V3 will adopt auto adjusting concentrated liquidity pools. These pools will leverage Astroport’s uniswap v3 inspired concentrated liquidity functionality ( Concentrated Liquidity | Uniswap). The Mirror staking pools will incentivize a liquidity price range, set by governance and based on the oracle price . For example if the incentivized liquidity spread is set to 25% the mirror liquidity pools will incentivize a price range that is 25% above and 25% below the price range.

Discussion topic : Do we want Mir staking pools to auto adjust users LP positions or do we want that to be a feature that external yield farms implement. What is the process for rebalancing liquidity in astroport?

Leveraged Liquidity - Mirror Native Flash Loans

To further improve capital efficiency of mAssets Mirror V3 will introduce design changes and integrations that support leveraged mAsset exposure .

To enable leveraged short and leveraged delta neutral LP exposure Mirror will enable mAsset-UST-LP to act as collateral. In addition Mirror will offer flashloans in order to allow these positions to be opened seamlessly and to introduce a new value capture mechanism for Mir token holders in the form of flashloan fees.

An example of how this will work:

Alice has 1000$ and wants a to open a delta neutral LP position to gain exposure to swap fees
The 1000$ is deposited in to mirror and in a single transaction the following occurs
A flash loan is taken out for 1000$ worth of mAsset
The 1000 UST and mAsset will be combined in to LP
The LP will be deposited into a Mirror CDP contract.

This will result in 1000$ worth of mAsset being backed by 200% collateral in the form of mAsset and UST .

A small portion of Mir tokens will be allocated to incentivizing these types of positions in line with Mir token distribution for LP.

When the position is opened there will be a 1% flash loan fee. And when the position is closed a 1.5% fee.

For leveraged short and leveraged delta neutral these positions will use mirror for loaning assets.

For leveraged long LP we will use both Mars and a Mirror native stable coin mUSD.

mUSD - Mirror native stable coin backed by aUST, mAsset-UST LP , and other yield bearing derivatives

This idea needs some more work, please reference Papi’s post here [Proposal] mUSD - a mirrored stablecoin backed by leveraged aUST - #23 by Papi


I can vouch for frontman.


I fully support this proposal. But can we invite someone from TFL to join the committee? (Maybe Kwon Do or Sihyeok)


Incentive Redirection:

  1. xMIR holders are able to redirect MIR emissions to specific trading pools (similar to CVX)
  2. incentives have a base function dependent on trading volume and liquidity so that unproductive pairs see incentives reduced, which then reduces liquidity provided by external LPs. [optimal liquidity:trading volume ratio of 20-30]. This also means new pairs can be introduced, not at the expense of existing pairs, as rewards are a function of xMIR/volume/Liquidity, which will be important as mirror scales up to a higher number of pairs.

Weighted pools/IL protection:

  1. Incentivize single mAsset holders (holders who buy the asset not for the sole purpose of providing liquidity) to supplement liquidity on top of that provided by LP-only users.
  2. To do so, implement weighted pools (90-10) as an option to both mAsset holders and UST holders
  3. As this means multiple LP’s exist for the same Asset (50-50, 90-10, 10-90), orders/trades can be fragmented and weighted according to market value of each LP.
  4. IL protection for 90-10 and 10-90 pools compensated by xMIR holders who redirect incentives to that pool (and receive xx% of trading fees as compensation) (read: Bancor)

Building up POL/Reserve for key trading pairs/assets:

  1. Portion of revenue/fees collated used to build-up assets/LPs (mTSLA, SPY, mUSD-UST) that acts as a reserve for MIR, ie establishing a floor/backing that appreciates in value. Assets/LPs in the reserve could also trade both on mirror (asset-UST LP AMM) and injective (single asset delta-neutral orderbook)

I believe that these implementations could make MIR more sustainable long term as incentives die down and trading fees become the main source of revenue.


To clarify we will retain existing emissions schedule and allow more granular control from governance, does this also include buyback emissions?

I like the premise here but we can also implement single side staking by enabling LP as collateral where a user can deposit UST and in one step a user can flashloan an mAsset , lp assets and collateralize the CDP with UST-mAsset LP. We can further offer LP incentivizes to the LP held in the CDP.

The bancor model relies on an elastic supply token model and i dont think it’s necessarily a good idea to change token models when we can already accomplish something similar to the bancor model using CDPS. With a CDP/flashloan model we can also earn fees from the flashloan and the CDP fees. We need to focus on models that enables us to incentivize long term liquidity where we dont need token emissions. And in the long term i think we do that by enabling leveraged exposure to swap fees , and adding various capital efficiency mechanisms to Mirror.

I like this idea, a portion of fees will be held in a DAO owned treasury where capital is deployed to anchor and various LP pools. With perhaps Mir buybacks at some sort of cadence. Do you think treasury held assets should get staking rewards?

Interested in joining the committee? In addition to core contributors we’d like to bring on engaged community members as advisors.

Yes, if we are not making any changes to max supply the existing emissions (including buybacks) would be what the xMIR holders have control over.

I hear your point about not changing max supply, from an LP’s POV he only cares about returns available and Prob(IL). Whilst all the capital efficiency measures you stated improve the first, the second is still unaddressed? Also, there will come a point where returns drop down to 20%-30%, liquidity then dries up, and users start taking the hit thru slippage/premium. As there will always be new dexes popping up, capital flight will be the next issue MIR faces in year 3/4 emissions schedule, worsening the UX/slippage problem. Worsening UX = lower usage = diminishing volume = diminishing LP returns = removal of LP = worsening UX.
Hence why I wanted to offer a bit of IL protection in some way (does not need to be exact replica of bancor model) so we can unlock the liquidity that is trapped in single asset holders who do not want to lose decent bit of their holdings to IL.
capital efficiency != IL protection imo.

I don’t see why not, I would imagine that we would likely hold more mAsset-UST LP’s as a first priority though (functions as both owned LP + generate revenue)

And yes would be happy to join as an advisor :slight_smile:

I’m not sure I fully understand the mechanism that you are proposing, but I like the concept as it sounds similar to the “mint on LP requirement” that I had been kicking around.

I think that letting users participate in the LP without minting mAssets is problematic for maintaining the peg, particularly when MIR incentives are being offered for both the LP and sLP.

In your flash loan example, it seems like the mAsset portion of the LP position may become under collateralized if the oracle price goes up enough. Also, how do you account for the fact that as the price goes up, there will be less of the mAsset in the LP? And what is then collateralizing the mAsset that left the LP?

can we get an idea of the current technical capabilities of this “collective of shadowy super coders”?

perhaps implement some of the passed MIR proposals (ie, produce mADA and some of the others) as a show of good faith. last thing mirror needs is a group of “ideas” people unable to execute.

The committee will be outsourcing development by offering a dao funded grant after establishing a formal roadmap , technical documents and receiving approval from the Mirror DAO by vote.

This is a open , community driven committee , if someone thinks they can do it better they are welcome to join us. We’re certainly looking to expand our committee as well as technical capabilities as indicated in my initial post.

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I’m interested in joining. I’d like to initially focus on improving the DAO’s ability to understand proposals and govern. This should be done in tandem with an extensive rework of the capital efficiency.

Indeed. This issue could be solved with weighted pools (90 UST 10 mAsset). IL and undercollateralisation risk are both mitigated.

This is great news! I hope v3 will capture more value for mir token. It is the moment that all governors have been waiting for. The idea of directing fees to anchor for buybacks is great. buybacks will grow on the long run ( so should mir price) and this will encourage people to lock.

If v3 can be delivered in the next 3-6 months that would be great. We need v3 urgently as TLV and mir price is going steadily downhill for quite long time.


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how’s the progress going ?

I was gonna raise a draft proposal for making mir-owned liquidity with vxMIR mechanism inspired by ve(3, 3) by andre. And found out you guys are working on mir revamp.

I love every feature you mentioned, but I would feel a lot better if we changed the emissions schedule. Having MIR emissions for only 4 years basically kills the protocol. Curve has proven you can have sustainable emissions if done properly with locking / bribes. Would love for MIR to move in that direction. I would happily lock MIR for 4 years with the features you outlined in your post.

Come hang out with us on discord Mirror Protocol

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Thank @Papi , good calls as usual and well moderate
Appreciate the mir efforts of the steering committee
to attract more capital efficiencies in the protocol with clear fair incentives and transparency.

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Hey guys, im stepping down and will no longer be involved in this project.

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may we know why? This is filling for 20 character limit

@Papi @Bill-Hwang
it is over , I don’t know if @Papi Papi will visit him in jail

Bill asks for 5g + laptop access from jail. To keep his overleverage positions in high premium to be sold in mir. I guess his lawyer is not cheap. + 80 years of jail is long when Bill is not young anymore.