Not only is it currently possible to short, a new mechanism that we are working on will allow for a similar balancing mechanism that he is describing.
@Sihyeok Could we pin this thread in the forum? Want it to stay at the top
Also could you give me admin status too so i can do it without having to ping you?
Added comments about migrating shuttle to a more decentralized bridge - Wormhole
when will the details be made public ? I think we should be careful about hpow we tweak reward distribution there is a risk that some mAsset have no liquidity and become ZOMBIE mAsset.
- Low incentive for gov participation
There are more than 11 million Mir staked in governance, but only a minority of people vote on the different proposals. Whitelist of the S&P Index Fund is straggling to pass! I believe we need to change this in order to have more active and vital governance.
Nonvoting Mir staked in governance should have no right or reduced right to staking rewards. We may think of different options:
Nonparticipation in voting activity for more than a week, if during that period proposals are up for a vote, takes away the right to receive staking rewards.
Or we may scale down the right to staking rewards as more weeks elapse without any voting participation. An example
No vote for 1 week results in a 33 % reduction in staking rewards
No vote for 2 weeks results in a 66 % reduction in staking rewards
No vote for 3 weeks results in a 100 % reduction in staking rewards
I believe that reduction in staking rewards for nonactive stackers is fair for people who actively participate in the evolution of Mirror Protocol and a premium for the locking period that a vote implies.
- Listing process is too slow
Since if we implement “no vote no reward” is implemented, more people will participate. If a quorum of 20% is reached we may think to pass the proposal before the end of the 7 day period.
If a whitelist pass and an oracle different from Band Protocol is not suggested with the whitelisting, then maybe there is no need for a 7 day parameter registration.
After/At the same time the reward balancing mechanism is introduced, we can introduce a minting fee in order to increase and stabilize MIR staking awards.
This can be considered to gather with Proposal to reduce mAsset burning fee
I think maybe a cost-free solution could be to make it easier for users to see when it would be profitable to mint and burn mAssets, like a profitability indicator (that takes into account the fees for all transactions needed to mint and burn) or a simulator to test things out without using real tokens at first. There would be some effort required to implement it but it could pay off over time if more users mint and burn more mAssets
I have just read this on Twitter, it sounds interesting
Impermanent Loss Protection is coming to THORChain. We love Bancor’s design, so we’re implementing that. 100 days, 1% per day protection, RUNE paid from Reserve to back-stop LP capital on redemption. Only applies to active pools
I’ve been thinking of some projects that we could create on non terra block chains to help improve liquidity in secondary markets , it would be very useful if v2 supported cross chain community spends. Should be fairly easy to implement, the main missing feature just now is the lack of ability to define memo for community spend proposals.
Why cant folks simply receive funds on terra and move them over
With the ability to deposit directly to a wallet cross chain it allows us to create a completely trustless applications on non terra chains and fund them with a decentralized governance proposal . Sure someone can receive funds and move them over, but that breaks the trustless nature of the app and if this is something that has to be funded on a regular basis it complicates such deployment.
Here’s an example, let’s say we create an LP farming contract on the BSC that pays out MIR, this would be used to promote more liquidity for a given market on the BSC chain , well with the ability to fund wallets via governance proposal , i could build a completely trustless contract , have it audited as such. Then when the project is ready for release a community spend proposal would be created to fund the contract address on the BSC chain , once the wallet is funded the farming contract can then payout farmers in wrapped mir on the BSC chain. Then on an on going basis if the community decides that BSC liquidity is good decision for the project, future community spend proposals could be created to disperse funds to the trustless BSC LP farming contract.
- Premiums persist : mAssets consistently trade at a premium to underlying stocks. There is little incentive for users to try to bring them down.
There’s a pretty simple solution to this. When mAsset price > oracle price, minters who currently get no rewards should get the lion’s share of the rewards and perhaps even all of the rewards. If the mAsset price < oracle price, do the opposite. You probably should have a happy medium when the mAsset price is trading in a tight band around the oracle price and allocate some of the rewards more equitably in this situation.
- Listing process is too slow : GME, AMC were attractive listing targets when the proposals were made, they are no longer as attractive now. How can we list mAssets faster?
Create a system in which there are thresholds for voting that determine how long the effective delay should be. Above a certain percentage, the listing becomes effective within an hour. Above another percentage, it is a day. Above the lowest threshold, it will be a week delay.
This is a good idea and one that has been considered. However, it was technically harder to discern whether or not the minter sold it or just LP/held it. Hence a slight modification has to be made.
I will be releasing a rough spec soon with basically the same underlying mechanism as you propose.
Does this mean we no longer have to consider implementing inverse tokens?
The mechanism is almost identically the same as the idea discussed on Monday but just a decision on whether or not the ‘mint/short/inverse/whatever’ token is tradable needs to be made.
If it is not tradable, it reduces to the case above.
If it is tradable, then the math/mech is a bit more complicated but it would increase capital efficiency for minters (another problem that has been mentioned).
i believe if this happened, many people will just log in quickly, not even bother to read the proposals and just click yes or no - that is also not the desired outcome. most probably, just yes.
i believe we could get more participation, by simply letting people know in tg, twitter, etc. the flipside community console is a case in point - it had only 2% or so votes, yesterday or the day before , i don’t quite remember, then in telegram the mods starting pushing it and telling people to get involved. now it has a lot of votes.
perhaps you could give extra rewards/airdrops to people who regularly vote and possibly even contribute in the forums, but this should be random - so no one quite knows how and when the rewards come. i think this could encourage people who are really interested in the ecosystem, to get more involved.
whilst the people who simply stake, just get standard rewards.
the best thing about the UNI airdrop last year, was that it was completely out of the blue, just for those people who supported their ecosystem. i think something like this would work better than just cancelling rewards unless you vote.
there is no incentive to vote early. It’s better to vote at the last minute to avoid getting your token locked for along period.
Not listed in the problems, but an opportunity to increase MIR utility could be to have it as a base for mAsset pricing. Was thinking MIR and possibly Luna pairings for pricing of the assets could create further usage of the two tokens, increase velocity of trading via arbitrage, and better bridge the Mirror ecosystem to Luna and external trading environments. For example we could for Google we could have
I guess on the eth.mirror.finance there could be and ETH base for the prices as well…just not really concerned with ETH though for MIR and Luna
Sure - this is technically possible on Terraswap/Uniswap. However, inflationary rewards would need to be figured out or not given at all to these pairs.
I agree with both of the above statements. It would decrease some selling pressure off MIR, as you would no longer need to exchange MIR for UST if you want to reinvest earnings.
A MIR/LUNA-pool could also be added then, all mAssets/Currencies would than be accessible on the platform directly.