Has the team considered implementing gauge voting to control the yield rewards similar to Curve and Sushi?
This would make incentives more dynamic to be able to respond to market conditions. Another feature could be to add vesting rewards to CDP minters when the price peg is above a certain threshold.
I wrote more in detail about this in the last governance incentives post
Yes, we are currently revising a new governance incentive structure for v2.
Disclaimer: I may not entirely understand the structure/ whole picture here so apologies if some of this misses the mark or doesnāt make any sense just spitballin:
It seems like the main reason mAssets are trading at a premium is lack of volume/ speculation and that once the user base has grown to a certain point the premiums on mAssets should come more in line with the price.
Is there not a way to somehow just add say liquidity for mAssets for the entire S&P, by using some of the existing MIR supply?
I think doing this if somehow possible would incentivize more people to actually trade mAssets versus LPing only. The simple fact that in order to Mint an mAsset you have to basically short in one of the strongest bull markets in history does not seem appealing.
Perhaps there is something with MIR that is similar to the way LUNA acts for UST and itās stablecoins? an elastic supply of sorts? or split so that if a user wants to mint an mAsset they have to put up half and the other half is provided by the protocol somehow and thatās the incentive for providing liquidity is that you just donāt have to put up as much collateral
again Iām aware Iām missing the finer details but just wanted to spark some creative thought
I agree on whatās been said about incentivizing more active governance on voting for half the proposals
I donāt believe premiums are an issue. For example, last week, we saw as low as 0.5% premium over actual assets. I think we see enough minting/selling that lowers the premium during the trading week. Premiums raising during the weekend is exactly what we want to see, no? This would suggest that people are purchasing massets when traditional markets are closed.
I apologize if this was not what you are referring to!
Been a bit swamped with everything + getting married! Will organize this thread a bit better soon
A three-part idea about increasing voter turnout. Reroute (or increase) fees, time-based staking, reward decay for non-participation.
Fees
Reroute a small portion of the LP commission generated to the governance stakers. This is the model Curve uses. It may be better at this time to only siphon a small % of the fees to keep the APR high on all the LPs. An alternative would be to add a small increase to tx costs that routes directly to governance stakers.
Time-Based Staking Rewards
Proportion rewards based on time-locked stakes.Rough suggestions below.
Lock-Up Period
1 Week: 1% of rewards
1 month: 5%
6 months: 30%
1 year: 64%
Voting
The increase in fees and MIR locking structure should increase staking by those dedicated to the success of the platform.
To increase governance participation the reward percentage should slowly decay based on missed votes. Add a third option to voting, āabstainā. This allows members to participate without always having to vote on something they have no interest or expertise in.
Return protocol changing governance votes to a longer time period to promote staking for a longer period of time. 30 day minimum for any vote that involves fee structure, etc. Keep governance votes for new assets short, allow traders to vote on these asset classes since they will be using them.
bump
time to get it done and level up V2
Maybe make it cheaper to create a poll? I think some people will not make a poll, because they could lose 100 MIR. Which is a lot of money for some people.
I donāt think it should be cheaper. People should recognise that polls are for carefully thought out proposals, and the high deposit amount should reflect that. If it was made cheaper, we would get an influx of half-baked proposals just because it costs less to do so.
Frankly, I think 100 MIR is too low; LUNA governance proposals require a min deposit of 500 LUNA. We should use that as a ballpark for deposit estimates.
Agreed. I do not wish to see low effort proposals/influx of masset proposals. Also, regarding non masset related proposals; if the proposals are well thought out, with clear benefits many will be willing to sponsor, myself included.
I have looked into alpaca finance during the last page. Finding their documents and incentive structure pretty interesting and should also be adaptable to mir. Maybe someone with more programming knowledge can look over it and tell, ift it would be feasable to implement a similar System here:
https://docs.alpacafinance.org/our-protocol-1/global-parameters
Donāt think margin should be a priority for v2, but maybe something to keep in the back of our heads.
Leveraged liquidity, such as Alpha Finance or Alpaca Finance type systems, would be great on mirror. Would give more return to investors and cause more liquidity on the stocks so lower slippage for end users.
If Anchor is protocol for borrowing against staked assets, can Anchor be tweaked to allow for borrowing UST against staked mAsset LP tokens? That would turbo charge mirror and anchor.
Thereās a team building this now
Amazing! Thanks for sharing!!! 
I have been thinking and doing some research about how could we integrate limit orders on top of Mirror, the solution I came up with sort of lies in the in the 2 words āon top.ā We donāt want to strive away from the AMM model since it serves a good use for broader range of protocol participants, aligning their orders with automatic liquidity. However, if we want to truly grow and bring onboard big players, the protocol will need to be able to service their needs as well in a matter of supporting their large orders mitigating slippage and price impact as much as possible.
I think it could be a potential solution to integrate an order book on top of the AMM. The participant will be able to place a limit at a desired price to buy/sell an asset in the pool. These orders will be stored while awaiting their execution, or unless another protocol participant decides to sell/buy into them.
So, when there is a request to make a trade, the limit orders will be taken first. Once the demand at that price is satisfied, it will move up to fill the next limit order and so on, vice versa in the sell scenario. I think this could be something a whale wanting to join Mirror Protocol could find appealing.
Another interesting proposition, is P2P dark pool transactions or OTC Desk. This could also be of interest for big players. Letās say there are 2 participants who want to exchange privately with each other a sizable order, mAAPL for UST. They could set up their own transaction, agree on the price quote and sell to each other with the use of smart contract. Thus, there will be no price impact on the ecosystem and utopia on the protocol is kept safe. Smaller users are satisfied and bigger players got what they wanted as well.
Hi. Building Sandclock. Reached out to Do Kwon on Twitter to no avail, probably gets too many messages :].
Anyway, we are building the tooling that will leverage crosschain {DeFi strategies w/ built-in insurance, payment rails and novel governance models} to enable seamless transfer of value across the web. From zero-loss, positive-sum donations that will amplify your contributions to the greater good, to facilitating frictionless payments, Sandclock is an exciting project in stealth mode and actively working towards elevating our project by building within regulatory frameworks and greatly enhanced UI/UX.
Currently, we are developing a number of crosschain yield strats, and I realized Mirrorās token design could be massively improved. Failure to do this will result in adversarial strategies and frustration from the community. Here is the list then,
Summary of suggestions:
Common arguments & Rebuttals
āBut MIR is volatile!ā
Yeah, because itās farmed and dumped. Give it utility, and it will actually stop being dumped, increasing stability and decreasing sell side pressure.
āBut UST is stable! Stable = Good!ā
Yeah, meaning that minting a synthetic stock is taking on a short position. If MIR were used as collateral instead, the prices could go up in unison as stock minting would translate to increased demand for MIR, thereby decreasing amount of liquidations. Would also improve tokenomics and price, thereby raising APY across the board, allowing the protocol to lower emissions and keep the money printer going for longer.
āWhy canāt we solve this with inverse stonks?!ā
Because there is more to this suggestion than ānot shorting,ā it is also about increasing demand for MIR.
Impediments
Rationale
You want a governance MINIMIZED protocol. You donāt want your users to vote every month on reward allocation or which stonks to mint. Coordination is a real issue, and that is peak bikeshedding and ripe for automation. The game theory is also here for users to only mint the assets that are most likely to generate a large amount of volume.
ALLOW MIR/ETH, MIR/UST, AND MIR/LUNA LPs TO PARTICIPATE IN GOVERNANCE
CONDITIONAL PROTOCOL FEE SHARING: vote to be able to claim rewards
Let me know your thoughts on this.
Buying/Selling many mAssets at the same time
If we want to diversify portfolio and buy many mAssets in V1 is very tedious. It would be nice if we could buying/selling many mAssets in one go.
Provide/Withdraw many mAssets at the same time
Same reason.
Stake/Unstake many mAssets at the same time
Same reason.
The split of liquidity is driving several of the problems with Mirror. Using stats from the last 24hr Terra is has 301m in liquidity and 60m in volume. ETH/BSC has 326m in liquidity and 8.5m in volume. Due to the nature of bonding curves larger amounts of liquidity have a 2+2=5 synergistic effect, and while expanding Mirrorās ecosystem to two of the largest smart contract chains in the world was and continues to be a good idea, Mirror is now a major player (Itād be the 11th largest defi project and is around 60% of the size of Synthetix). In order to create a deeper, more liquid market that will help to address issues #1/#2 directly via incentivizing liquidity on Terra by dropping Mirror emissions to 90/10 for the ETH network over a tapered period. The specifics of this can be discussed later. This would also encourage people to utilize the core mirror features of minting/staking/voting due to only having that option on the Terra version of Mirror. Terra already only supports GME/AMC. We need to incentivize LPs who provide actual liquidity, and we can help alleviate some of the other problems as Mirror grows to become the largest synthetic asset platform.
I think this would be a helpful user interface.
May be it could be done by
@sim Would this work?