Mechanism to allow whitelisting below quorum


If votecount < quorum and novote/votecount < 10% then Pass. Effectively raising the rejection bar below quorum participation when there’s a strong Pass sentiment in proportion to No votes.

The last 11 whitelist proposals which didn’t reach quorum and haven’t been whitelisted before are predominantly because of the low participation, not no votes. Because of that, I propose a change of the rule that reaching quorum is necessary. The new quorum rule for a whitelist proposal would be tallying the total participating votes and if the proportion of yes votes is above 90% then Pass the whitelist where it would otherwise be rejected.

Why 10%?

In this sheet, we see that the last 11 whitelists for rejected whitelists that didn’t reach quorum. We can see that;

When rejected with the new ruleset the mean of no is 29% with an interval of 17-39%.

When passed with the new ruleset the mean of no is 1.78% with an interval of 0.2%-4.6%.

The average proportion is 15% no.

So this shows that when there’s a strong NO sentiment the average no vote proportion is significantly over our 10% rule, about 3x the new rule. This implies that with the 10% will be sufficiently easy to block whitelists if there’s some consensus on the no side. While also being sufficient to pass a whitelist below quorum if the no votes are simply not there. For example, both Shopify and ARK had yes votes in the million while no votes being in the 3000 range.

Something like this could be displayed in some way in governance. Ie “This whitelist proposal would PASS/REJECT if the vote closed now.” and only apply to whitelist proposals.

Here’s a poll to gauge support

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I think this is a pretty good idea. I would say the 10% number that you derived would have to be evaluated further to see if that is ideal.

I don’t want to discourage your proposal by saying “wait for v2”. I think the wait for v2 sentiment might make it more challenging to advance this proposal.

Good analysis.

Hey -

We are currently working on a revised version of governance. Here’s a sneak-peek:

Assume K total rewards given to governance at a given time. Then K/2 of these rewards are distributed to all stakers. The remain K/2 rewards are split evenly into n buckets where each bucket corresponds to an on-going poll. Only voters in a given poll will receive rewards corresponding to the bucket (pro-rated by MIR used in vote).

We hope this will incentivize active voting, and help users pass the quorum more easily. We will also be adding an abstain option as a vote (in cases where you feel that you lack proper knowledge to vote).

Once this releases (target end-April to mid-May), we will monitor the situation to see if further changes are necessary.


Hi, the mechanism of voting for asset listing is fundamentally wrong. Voting on which stock to list is not correct. As a protocol, we should encourage more asset listing, as the more assets are listed in Mirror, more traders are coming in, deeper the liquidity, then more trading activity, it becomes a healthy cycle. Getting people to vote is kind of weird. How does an average people to decide which stock to list. More people like us just want to invest in something that can grow.

well, my suggestion is fundamentally different, how about we let people to mint the stock they would like to see in Mirror, and reward them accordingly when they parked their money in mAsset they mint (Anchor protocol of 20% is good). while substantial amount of mAsset is minted (we can set it as $1m worth or sth), the protocol will then list them in open market for any trader to trade. I get this idea from asgardEx where people just pool their coins which they want them to list, hopefully they will be listed one day. Similar to coinbase asset custody, where more people park their coins there, the higher chance it get listed.

Anyway, it is just my idea, and I really hope that Mirror can be successful in gaining interest in crypto world.

K/2 and the abstain option could work… thank you

Yepp I agree, more evaluation of what an actual % would be. Will hold off on this until we see how the new incentive structure affects the quorum hurdle!

Thanks for the sneak-peek. These changes sounds promising getting over the quorum, really looking forward to see it in action!

I think there’s a reason why these votes fail to reach quorum - large Mirror investors and users don’t want to approve new assets at this time. Someone could very easily abuse this by flooding proposals.

Yes I think there’s a bit of that, fear of dilution to LP rewards. You don’t want to dilute the rewards and that’s a real problem if this platforms aim is to “mirror everything under the moon” as Do stated somewhere. However we can’t know to what extend that is and this mechanism would hopefully raise participation on the NO side so that we atleast reach a quorum, never mind the outcome. I also think that it isn’t that users don’t want to approve more assets, I just think that it’s predominantly lazy capital and disinterest. Could also be that not voting is really a lazy no vote since you get punished with fees and lockup. So incentivizing participation is a great way to go.

Anti flooding mechanisms are still the same, 500MIR deposit and 7 days voting time. So you stake 500MIR to the risk of just 10% of the total votes say no. Where the average no proportion is 15% I don’t think its an issue.

Thanks for the update, sounds good. Looking forward to it.

average people don’t really care which asset to vote. they just want to see their $MIR grow. I think voting to whitelist asset is not a good way as people has no interest. I don’t think if u change the incentive structure, it will change anything! and more and more $MIR are held in eXchanges in Mirror system.

Was wondering why so many were rejected. Support this idea, and while at it, should list more business that support crypto like Paypal, Square etc. :slight_smile: